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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND LAW REFORM IN JAPAN:
FROM THE LOST DECADE TO THE END OF HISTORY?
Abstract: Japan is in the midst of massive law reform. Mired in ongoing
recession since the early 1990s, Japan has been implementing a new
regulatory blueprint to kickstart a sluggish economy through structural
change. A key element to this reform process is a rethink of corporate
governance and its stakeholder relations. With a patchwork of legislative
initiatives in areas as diverse as corporate law, finance, labour relations,
consumer protection, public administration and civil justice, this new
model is beginning to take shape.
But to what extent does this model represent a break from the past?
Some commentators are breathlessly predicting the “Americanisation”
of Japanese law. They see the triumph of Western-style capitalism — the
“End of History”, to borrow the words of Francis Fukuyama — with its
emphasis on market-based, arms-length transactions. Others are more
cautious, advancing the view that there new reforms are merely
“creative twists” on what is a uniquely (although slowly evolving)
strand of Japanese capitalism.
This paper takes issue with both interpretations. It argues that the new
reforms merely follow Japan’s long tradition of ‘adopting and adapting’
foreign models to suit domestic purposes. They are neither the
wholesale importation of “Anglo-Saxon” regulatory principles nor a thin
veneer over a ‘uniquely unique’ form of Confucian cultural capitalism.
Rather, they represent a specific and largely political solution
(conservative reformism) to a current economic problem (recession).
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The larger themes of this paper are ‘change’ and ‘continuity’. ‘Change’
suggests evolution to something identifiable; ‘continuity’ suggests
adhering to an existing state of affairs. Although notionally opposites,
‘change’ and ‘continuity’ have something in common — they both
suggest some form of predictability and coherence in regulatory reform.
Our paper, by contrast, submits that Japanese corporate governance
reform or, indeed, law reform more generally in Japan, is contextspecific, multi-layered (with different dimensions not necessarily pulling
all in the same direction – for example, in relations with key outside
suppliers), and therefore more random or ‘chaotic’.
Author Contact: Dr. Luke Nottage and Leon Wolff
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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND LAW REFORM IN JAPAN:
FROM THE LOST DECADE TO THE END OF HISTORY?*
Luke Nottage & Leon Wolff

I. FROM THE LOST DECADE TO THE END OF HISTORY?
Much has been made of Japan’s ‘lost decade’. With economic
stagnation, financial crisis and record corporate insolvencies
during the 1990s, Japan’s once all-mighty economic machine
appears to have lost its way. But sluggishness in economic
performance stands in contrast to an enormous burst of activity in
law reform. On a scale comparable to the massive legal innovation
when Japan re-opened to the world in the Meiji Restoration from
1868 and the democraticisation of constitutional and economic
law during the Allied Occupation from 1945 to 1952, Japan is
embarking on a ‘third wave’ of legal and regulatory reform. The
primary driver of the reform movement is growing desperation to
regain economic momentum. A guiding theme is dismantling ex
ante regulation of businesses primarily by public authorities and
introducing more indirect means of ex post control by empowering
private entities with private or corporate law remedies.1

*

The core of this chapter builds heavily on Nottage (2001b) and its Working
Paper version available through http://www.iue.it/PUB/WorkingPapers.shtml,
extensively updated and supplemented by research drawing on the authors'
work as contributing editors for the Japan tab of the CCH Doing Business in
Asia looseleaf/CD-ROM service (Nottage and Wolff 2000-3). Additional
references and data can be found in those works. In addition to those
acknowledged therein, we acknowledge valuable feedback and information from
Phil Jamieson of Nagashima Ohno Tsunematsu and participants in the 2004
Corporate Law Teachers’ Association Conference (8-11 February, Australian
National University). All internet references were available at the URLs given
as of 1 February 2004.
1
However, Schaede (2000, 2003) argues that another theme of the reform
movement is that public regulation by bureaucracies is giving way to self-
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What should be made of these legal developments? An emerging
line of analysis is that Japanese law is in the process of
‘Americanisation’. According to Daniel Keleman and Eric Sibbitt
(2002), for example, the Americanisation of Japanese law is evident
from accelerating economic liberalisation, political fragmentation,
and greater ‘legalisation’ in everyday life in Japan since the ‘lost
decade’. Curtis Milhaupt (2003), too, submits that, despite some
‘stickiness’ in traditional corporate governance norms, Japanese
corporate law is taking on more visibly American shape. The core
claim is that American law represent the global standard in
corporate regulation, and that Japan is inching its way —
inexorably — towards adopting this standard.
This thesis of the Americanisation of Japanese law recalls Francis
Fukuyama’s (1992) famous prediction about the ‘end of history’ —
that U.S.-style political democracy and market-based economic
ordering would triumph in the post-communist order. The
attraction of Fukuyama’s ideas has not been limited to political
scientists, economists, and business leaders. They have also found
traction in the legal academy. For example, Henry Hansmann and
Reiner Kraakman (2001), law professors from Yale and Harvard
respectively, prophesised the ‘end of history for corporate law’.
They write in support of continued and accelerating convergence
on a shareholder-oriented model of corporate governance,
involving extensive use of market-based control mechanisms to
guide corporate activity and corporate law. Paralleling Fukuyama,
Hansmann and Kraakman (2001: 443-9) emphasize the ‘failure of
alternative models’: the ‘manager-oriented model’ (popular in the
US until the 1960s), the ‘labour-oriented model’ (entrenched
primarily in Germany), the ‘state-oriented model’ (perceived as
dominating post-war France and Japan), and ‘stakeholder models’
(seen as mere variants on older manager- or labour-oriented
models). They then argue that competitive pressures will cause

regulation by private industry associations. Less globally competitive industries
are tending to adopt self-regulation with more risk of anti-competitive effects.
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convergence on the shareholder-oriented model and highlight the
rise of the shareholder class worldwide, conceding, however, that
change has so far occurred at the level more of corporate practices
than of formal legal rules. Other commentators have taken this a
step further, in the related area of competition law, implying ‘the
end of anti-trust history’.
This triumphalism — that American law represents both the
pinnacle of legal achievement and the global standard to which
other legal systems aspire to achieve — has attracted many critics.
Some, for example, argue that US anti-trust law and practice has a
bifurcated tradition, with one strand closer to the European
Union’s model of regulation more through administrative agencies
than private enforcement for the primary benefit of dispersed
consumers (Perez 2002). Others contend that a ‘general process of
Americanisation in legal thinking’ – or ‘imperial law’ – is ‘a
dominant layer in world-wide legal systems’, but one underpinned
by ‘a spectacular process of exaggeration, aimed at building
consent for the purpose of hegemonic domination’ (Mattei 2003:
383), and encountering resistance in continental Europe.
Moreover, doubts have been raised about the straightforward
Americanisation of corporate law. For example, von Nessen (1999,
2003) notes that the wave of reforms to Australian corporate law
since the late 1990s, although inspired by some specific US
developments and more general concepts, were filtered through
the lens of an English law tradition. Further, Australian law
reforms encounter local circumstances (see generally Cheffins
2002). Full-scale ‘Americanisation of Japanese law’ seems equally,
if not more, implausible. Indeed, aspects of Japanese private law
may be undergoing a new round of ‘Europeanisation’ and more
idiosyncratic globalisation (Nottage 2004).
This chapter aims to assess claims of Americanisation of Japanese
law by critically examining the recent raft of reforms to Japanese
corporate governance. At first blush, there is much to suggest
Americanisation. First, corporate governance has indeed shifted
towards a more shareholder-oriented model: the law now provides
for more direct control potential for shareholders to monitor
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opportunistic managers. Second, certain non-shareholders
(especially creditors) are empowered with greater arms’ length
control mechanisms. However, the degree and direction of the
transformations vary according to the stakeholder (Nottage 2001b).
For example, direct controls by employees, still an important
stakeholder in Japanese companies, are declining more slowly.
Further, suppliers, consumers, government authorities and even
NGOs appear still more prepared to interact with companies and
managers on the basis of trust, rather than designing control
mechanisms on the assumption that there will always be
opportunism or deviance which needs to be guarded against (cf
also Fukuyama 1996). In short, Japanese corporate governance –
and indeed its entire system of capitalism – is converging to a
degree on the US model, but at divergent rates seemingly related
to resilient underlying norms and philosophies (see also Sarra and
Nakahigashi 2002). It may be that this is a temporary situation, on
the way to a more consistent end of history à la américaine. But it
seems more likely that this is more or less a new equilibrium, as
seems to have been reached also in German corporate law reform
(du Plessis 2004). The picture in Japan is clouded by complexity
within economic ordering as well as greater competition in
politics (cf Dore 2000). This more ‘chaotic’ outcome, combining
change with elements of continuity, may be difficult for
economists, political scientists and lawyers to handle; but should
be more readily appreciated by practitioners and analysts of
business management, where messy practical realities are valued
as well as elegant theory.
II. REALIGNING STAKEHOLDERS IN JAPANESE CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE
This chapter adopts a stakeholder analysis to outline the contours
of change and continuity. Although the relationship between
managers and shareholders is central to conceptualising the
operation of corporate entities, other stakeholders are also
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influential, including creditors, employees or suppliers, and even
local residents or government authorities.2
A stakeholder analysis focuses attention on major problems
common to all stakeholder relationship. An important problem is
incomplete information. If all shared full information,
shareholders or creditors, for instance, would not have to worry
about managers wasting their money. Yet in the real world,
incomplete information gives rise to the dual problems of ‘adverse
selection’ (‘hidden information’, resulting for example in creditors
accepting to lend money to what turn out to be generally high-risk
firms) and ‘moral hazard’ (‘hidden action’, for example managers
investing loaned funds into excessively high risk projects). These
difficulties are compounded by others: (i) the inability to write
contracts for the stakeholder relationships which expressly
provide for all possible contingencies, because of the limits in
foreseeing future scenarios (Hoshi 1998: 849-850); and (ii) the
inability to perfectly enforce those contracts. These definitions of
adverse selection and moral hazard highlight underlying problems
of opportunism and bounded rationality (Williamson 1996). They
can be usefully developed to uncover and structure empirical data
concerning relations involving managers and shareholders (II.1
below), creditors of the firm (Part II.2), and employees (Part II.3).
The overall picture is one of (i) significant rapprochement of
manager and shareholder interests and the (ii) elimination of
cartel-like regulation of banks and other financial institutions; but
(iii) less obvious or more gradual pressures reshaping employment
relations.
Yet raw opportunism may not be the only force at work (Part II.4).
A stakeholder analysis can also reveal robust patterns of
cooperative relations among participants. Consider, for example,
the automobile industry in post-war Japan and, subsequently in

2

Cf also Kester 1996; Ballon and Honda 2000. Tsuru (1999: 3) cautions that such
a broad definition of corporate governance may risk analytic looseness (see also
Cioffi 2000. But cf Aoki 2003.
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the U.S. Where an expanding group of participants engage in quite
radical information gathering and sharing among one another, they
entrenching trust, leading to the emergence of novel forms of
corporate governance (Helper, McDuffie and Sabel 2000). Although
the overall trend is towards arms’ length relations in Japan,
cooperation is still in evidence. In particular, there is evidence of
new patterns of cooperation at the level of the Japanese state and
civil society (Schwartz and Pharr eds 2003), increasingly important
stakeholders in corporate organizations.
A. SHAREHOLDERS BECOMING PRIMARY STAKEHOLDERS
The separation of ownership from control in public listed
companies,3 leading to the emergence of a distinct managerial class
with interests no longer necessarily aligned with shareholders, has
become an agreed starting point for analysing corporate
governance since being highlighted in the US by Berle and Means
(1991 [originally 1932]). Particularly since Japan’s US-led
Occupation following World War II, successive reforms to Japanese
corporate law have often been directed precisely at protecting
shareholders’ rights (Hayakawa 1997).
In fact, from the perspective of agency theory, two categories of
constraints are available to shareholders to counter particularly
the informational advantage held by managers. The first is ‘control
oriented’. The shareholders monitor management behaviour, often
delegating this to a Board of Directors whom they elect; and they
intervene if necessary, for example by a proxy vote fight, to replace
directors and hence managers. However, the costs involved in this

3

There are about 9,000 such companies in Japan (Kanda 1998 contains useful
further background corporate data), including about 6330 with sufficient capital
for listing (Yasui 1999: 3). Closely held companies, in which shareholders
typically remain managers or are closely related to them, offer different avenues
for opportunistic behaviour. Despite their aggregate importance in the Japanese
economy, these companies’ problems have not generated the same degree of law
reform and discussion in recent years (see for example Shishido 1990). This
chapter therefore only mentions them in passing (at Part II.2).
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system usually make it more attractive to large shareholders with
good management skills themselves. A second system available to
shareholders, ‘arm’s length’ control, is more passive. The
shareholders do not actively intervene in management. However,
they take action when dissatisfied with managers, especially by
selling shares, which may lower share prices and for example
encourage hostile takeovers. Alternatively, indirect control can be
promoted through institutions better aligning the interests of
managers with shareholders, for example through high-powered
incentive methods such as very profit-sensitive bonuses or stock
options (Hoshi 1998: 851-2). The received wisdom about
companies in post-War Japan is that such arm’s length controls
have been particularly weak.
Openly hostile takeovers have certainly been rare.4 In large part,
this is due to the development of extensive cross-shareholdings
among firms. The main reason for cross-shareholdings emerging
remains unclear, although most accounts point to stock market
weaknesses soon after World War II, when capital was needed by
companies and the threat of takeovers was high. Ironically, crossshareholding also may have developed because Japanese corporate
law, influenced by U.S. law, further extended substantive rights to
shareholders, yet many of those rights have remained mandatory
(Shishido 2000: 211). Japanese managers therefore may have
encouraged the development of cross-shareholding as an
alternative way to protect their interests.5

4

Nonetheless, there have been several major hostile takeover battles since the
late 1990s. Tokumoto (2001) discusses four that resulted in court judgments,
and criticises Japanese judges for too readily thwarting takeovers by allowing
incumbent directors to issues shares to third parties (ostensibly due to a need to
raise capital). Another well-publicised case of ‘greenmail’ involved a US
investor, T Boone Pickens, between 1989 and 1991 (Reich 2001).
5
See also Takahashi 1997: 232. Managers in the US and elsewhere have been
able to invoke other techniques more recently, through tailoring their corporate
constitutions etc (for example ‘poison pills’ whereby a debenture etc must be
issued if an investor purchases more than a set percentage of shares, or
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Nonetheless, some arm’s length control continued to be exercised
through ostensibly ‘friendly’ takeovers or mergers. These often
occurred in the context of poor performance, reflected in weak
share prices; and strong correlations have been found between
share price weakness and resignations of managers (Kaplan and
Ramseyer 1996). Thus, while managers are not replaced by those
taking over firms, as in hostile bids, they retire ‘voluntarily’.
Shishido (2000: 216) provides one important causal explanation for
this pattern: Japanese firms who perform badly on the sharemarket
find it difficult to raise equity finance, and that makes it more
difficult to obtain debt finance from banks. Such pressures have
grown as Japan has mired itself in recession. Conversely, he notes
some recent evidence that pressures from the Japanese share
market already are forcing some firms to restructure their labor
relations, and then signaling satisfaction with that management
response in the form of higher share prices (idem, fn 112). Overall,
moreover, aggregate cross-shareholding in publically traded shares
has declined significantly since the stock market collapse and
burst of Japan’s ‘bubble’ economy in the early 1990s.6 Further,
building from this competing tradition of such indirect control
mechanisms and more recent changes to Japan’s socio-economic
environment, a few ‘norm entrepreneurs’ are now openly
embarking on hostile takeover activity (Milhaupt 2001: 21-23). A
growing body of empirical research shows how significant change
can be achieved in Japan by law reform legitimizing new social

arrangements to limit to voting rights to a minority percentage even if the
investor obtains more than that percentage of shares). The liberalisation of
stock option schemes in Japan may open the way to such stratagems, but this
possibility has not been openly discussed much (Kozuka 2003). It probably
awaits a more comprehensive move towards pro-active commercial lawyering
linked to major reforms now underway in the Japanese legal profession
(Kobayashi 2003).
6
Takahashi 1997: 233-4. Indeed the pace seems to be accelerating (for example
Shishido 2000: 226, Table 6). As well as banks’ immediate need to cash-up, this
trend may be underpinned by a more forward-looking appreciation that main
bank shareholdings have tended to be in firms with smaller prospects for growth
(evidenced by Hori and Osano 2002).
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norms, or reinforcing selected existing ones.7 With takeovers, a
quite amenable legal framework has long been in place, in terms of
formal substantive law provisions, and that may make it even
easier for social norms to be reformulated and take root. Milhaupt
and West (2001) argue that this process is already underway,
underpinned by takeovers’ potential to promote efficient diversity
in corporate organisations.
More directly aligning the interests of managers and shareholders
has met with more mixed success. Stock option schemes have
been progressively liberalized since the mid-1990s, and in 2002 the
Tokyo District Court adopted an interpretation favourable to the
taxpayer. However, this has been appealed by the government, and
tax legislation continues to change. Also, the stock options
involved in this litigation were issued by foreign companies. 8 Still,
stock option schemes appear to have steadily gained in popularity,
with 800 Japanese companies reportedly having them by 2000
(Ahmadjian 2003: 222). However, such schemes may be subjected
to increasing scrutiny if and when committees for remunerating
managers are established (as discussed below) and Japan’s
sharemarket revives significantly, even though executive
remuneration in Japan has remained comparatively low. Problems
of excessive remuneration have been exposed in countries like the
US and Australia following spectacular corporate collapses in
recent years (Clarke et al 2003), highlighting the need for
transparency and some limits in setting remuneration packages to
provide incentives to managers to work in shareholders’ interests
(Hill and Yablon 2003). Similar issues arise with bonuses and other
remuneration for managers which are tightly tied to performance.
Although these have not been common in post-War Japan either,
performance-linked employment is steadily replacing seniority-

7

For example West 1997, Feldman 2001, Nottage 2004.
Watanabe 2004, discussing mainly the Microsoft case, decided on 26
November 2002 and reported in 1106 Hanrei Taimuzu, p. 28. He notes that on
the same day, the Tokyo District Court decided a quite similar case involving
Compaq.

8
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based ‘life-long’ employment even in the larger blue-chip
companies (Shibata 2002; and generally Part II.3 below).
Compounding this shift, whereas shareholders may have achieved
some indirect arm’s length control over managers because of the
latter’s ‘career concerns’ – tying their reputation to company
performance (Tsuru 1999: 5) – Japan’s protracted economic
stagnation appears to be underpinning the slow emergence of
alternative mechanisms.
At the same time, control-oriented mechanisms have been
expanding too. To be sure, as cross-shareholdings have declined,
the potential for such shareholders to exercise direct control over
managers in the other companies has been reduced. However, such
control was limited anyway, due to relatively small blocs of shares
being held by rather loosely affiliated groups, perhaps reinforced by
a norm against active intervention which made sense during
Japan’s era of strong economic growth. A much more important
direct check on managers has been exercised by ‘main banks’,
often holding an even smaller shareholding in the client firm
(statutorily limited to 5 percent), but able to monitor its
performance by providing a broad array of services and to
intervene if necessary (Milhaupt 2002). As mentioned below (Part
II.2), however, the main bank system has come under even greater
pressure than cross-shareholdings generally, due to crises and
deregulation in financial markets especially since the late 1990s.
Nonetheless, at least partially offsetting these two trends, the
potential for more control-oriented checks on managers has been
expanded by the growing importance of institutional investors in
Japan, as elsewhere. Japan’s pension funds and the like now find
themselves in dire financial straits, with no guarantees – even
implicit – that the government will be interested or able to bail
them out, given its own crisis in preparing for a rapidly ageing
population (Morgan 2001). Even more significant, at least to the
mind of many Japanese managers in recent years, is the growing
‘presence’ of foreign pension funds demanding better results and
transparency from the firms they invest in (Ahmadjian 2003: 2323). In the shadow of major changes in accounting standards, ‘return
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on equity’ has become a more pervasive concern even among firms
with no or limited foreign investment, as evidenced by the recent
popularity of share buy-backs.9
Even smaller investors, including a now strong proportion from
abroad in the wake of Japan’s stockmarket downturn over the
1990s, can also exert direct control through actual or potential
derivative actions against managers who fail to act in the best
interests of the company, including the interests of shareholders.
Following a reduction in filing fees in 1993, the numbers of
derivative lawsuits have grown rapidly. Activist lawyers and
groups have emerged, taking advantage of the new institutional
realities and promoting another shift in norms about the ‘proper’
role for shareholder interests, illustrated and cemented by a
remarkable victory in 2000 against Daiwa Bank executives.
Concerns on the part of mangers about personal liability in such
litigation led in 2002 to further law reforms to limit somewhat the
scope or effects of derivative actions (Black and Cheffins 2003: 83).
However, the legal and socio-economic framework for derivative
actions remains very different from that present at the start of
Japan’s lost decade (West 2001b).
Some skeptics suggest that the restrictions enacted in 2002 were
primarily a ‘defensive’ reaction promoted by managers, as indeed

9

Amendments to the Commercial Code, coming into operation on 1 October
2001, removed the restrictions on share buy-back schemes. Under the new
provisions, share buy-backs are permitted provided the repurchase is authorized
by shareholders in advance at the annual general meeting and the repurchase is
funded out of distributable profits. Share buybacks give shareholders a greater
share of company profits. This is because share repurchases transfer wealth
from selling shareholders to the residual shareholders, and increases earnings
per share. Major Japanese companies (spearheaded for example by Sony,
Matsushita, NTT, Honda and Toyota) are increasingly using these new powers
to protect the value of shareholders’ equity investments. According to a report
in the Japan Times (20 May 2002), Japanese companies listed on the first section
of the Tokyo Stock Exchange have announced share buy-back plans involving
4.2 trillion yen worth of shares, double that which was repurchased in all of
fiscal year 2001.
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were reductions in the large numbers of managers traditionally
elected to Boards of Directors in Japan. They emphasized how only
remaining Board members, not the new category of ‘executive
officers’, were left at risk of derivative actions. However, this shift
to smaller boards seems to have begun in the late 1990s (Moerke
2003). Further, downsizing was initiated primarily by Sony, a wellmanaged company with high foreign ownership. It also committed
itself to including independent directors on the downsized Board,
emphasizing its role as a monitor (especially on behalf of
shareholders) over the activities of executive officers and other
line managers. Sony’s new system therefore seems better
explained by pressures like those described above, particularly the
more or less latent demands of investors, and a realisation that
other mechanisms minimizing poor managerial performance were
being undermined precisely as Japanese companies were being
exposed to ever-greater legal and economic risks.
Further, by June 2001, 35.7 percent of listed companies had already
adopted what Puchniak (2003) calls a ‘Sony Type Company’ model
and 24.4 percent of companies were contemplating adopting it. In
other words, only 40 percent of companies still seemed wedded to
the ‘Old Type Company’ model, involving a very large Board
(including
many
managers
primarily
with
executive
responsibilities), complemented by ‘statutory auditors’ or ‘auditing
officers’ (kansayaku) supposed to monitor certain activities of the
Board. In 2002, the Commercial Code was amended to allow large
companies to retain either of these structures, or adopt either what
Puchniak terms a ‘New Type Company’ variant on Sony’s original
model, or a ‘Reformed Old Type Company’ model instead further
boosting the kansayaku system. As highlighted in Chart 1 below,
key differences between the ‘Sony Type Company’ model and the
‘New Type Company’ model are that the latter demands at least
two outside directors, key decisions (for example on remuneration)
must be made by committees involving some them, and officers
are also open to shareholder derivative suits.
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CHART 1: JAPANESE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MODELS AFTER THE
2002 REFORM
Old Type
Company

Reformed Old
Type
Company

Sony Type
Company

New Type
Company

Number of
outside
directors

No requirement
for outside
directors
according to law
No outside
directors in
practice

One outside
director
required by
law

No outside
directors
required by law
2 to 3 outside
directors in
practice

2 outside
directors
required by
law

Number of
directors

3 directors
required by law
20 to 40
directors in
practice

At least 10
directors
required by
law

3 directors
required by law
10 directors in
practice

3 directors
required by
law

Targets of
Shareholder
Class-Action
Law Suits

Directors and
Statutory
Auditors

Directors and
Statutory
Auditors

Directors and
Officers
(shikko yaku)
Officers are
(also) subject
to derivative
actions

Committees

No committees
required by law
Managing
committee
composed of a
few senior
directors who
make all
important
decisions in
practice

Managing
committee
required by
law (three or
more
members)
No outside
directors
required on
managing
committee

Directors and
Statutory
Auditors
However, many
of the decision
makers are
officers (shikko
yakuin) but not
subject to
derivative
actions
No committees
required by law
Committee
system with
outside directors
in practice

Nominating,
remuneration
and audit
committee
(three or more
members per
committee,
the majority
with outside
directors)
required by
law

14

Statutory
auditors
(kansayaku)
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4 statutory
auditors required
by law
At least half of
the statutory
auditors are
required by law
to be outsiders

4 statutory
auditors
required by
law
At least half of
the statutory
auditors are
required by
law to be
outsiders
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4 statutory
auditors required
by law
At least half of
the statutory
auditors are
required by law
to be outsiders

Statutory
auditors
prohibited by
law

(Puchniak 2003, emphasis added)

Several criticisms have been directed at this new menu of
corporate governance options, in concluding that little real change
will eventuate (see generally for example Rodatz 2003). First, the
requirement of ‘independence’ for directors (and indeed
kansayaku) is thought not to be strict enough. However, that
awaits clarification by the courts, and/or the risk that rules will be
further tightened once a firm has sunk costs into transforming
itself into a Reformed Old Type Company or especially a New
Type Company.
A second criticism is that the reform will not work because
companies will not move especially from a Sony Type Company
into a New Type Company, because this will expose their
executive officers also to shareholder derivative actions (Kashiwagi
2003, p.7). However, the risks for such officers are limited
somewhat by the safeguards enacted in 2002. Anyway, many of
those who have already gone to the trouble of becoming a Sony
Type Company are likely to be firms which are better managed or
genuinely want to improve their governance and overall
performance.
Third, the reform does not force companies to adopt a particular
model; in other words, the reform is ‘elective’ (Nottage 2003). This
criticism tends to be made particularly by US commentators,
describing the ‘New Type Company’ as the US model and the
most efficient one. A potential irony here is that at least some
Japanese policy-makers are probably being more consistent with
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the ideology of market liberalism generally propounded so
vigorously in the US. Ahmadjian (2003: 230) observes that the
logic of Japan’s Ministry of External Trade and Industry (METI,
previously MITI) was that ‘the market would eventually decide
which form of governance was most effective’. On the other hand,
she concedes that METI had initially favoured more the New Type
Company model, but leaving open a choice (to move also to a
Reformed Old Type Company) ‘was a compromise under pressure
from Keidanren … facing its own internal pressures, both from
global firms that wanted to reshape their boards to reflect US
practices, and from domestic firms which resisted change’.10 Less
invasive pressure on companies to reform their governance
structures has also been a hallmark of Anglo-Commonwealth
countries, which have also drawn more or less on US features in
fashioning the options (Puchniak 2003); and leaving in particular
options based on the kansayaku system may reflect an enduring
attraction of German corporate law, which moreover has
implemented mostly on an optional basis (du Plessis 2004).
However, as mentioned in the Conclusions below (Part III), the
element of compromise – and its particular style: leaving in place
existing structures, and just superimposing reformed structures –
does appear to represent a ‘reformist conservatism’ found in other
areas of Japanese law and society (Nottage 2001c).
Thus, it is hardly compelling to argue that Japan’s ‘elective
corporate governance reform’ does not go far enough yet, at the
same time, it already signals a significant step towards ‘Americanstyle’ corporate governance (Senechal 2003). More interesting are

10

Nippon Keidanren was formed in 2002 by amalgamating two important peak
business bodies, Keidanren (Japan Federation of Economic Organisations) and
Nikkeiren (Japan Federation of Employers' Associations). The former, in
particular, includes larger firms which have increasingly pushed for
liberalisation in Japan as they expanded their operations world-wide
(Yoshimatsu 2000). The current Chairman of Nippon Keidanren (and Toyota),
has been robust in his criticism of the Koizumi administration for not being
decisive and innovative enough in carrying out structural reform (Okuda 2003).
On changes in METI’s stance towards economic reform, see Elder 2003.
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prognoses like that of Ahmadjian (2003, p. 231) who argues that
this reform illustrates nicely the thesis of ‘Japan’s managed
globalisation’ based on ‘permeable insulation’ (Schaede and
Grimes 2003). She predicts the emergence of:
a dual system of governance[:) Globally oriented
firms would increase board independence and
introduce auditing, nomination and compensation
committees, while more domestically focused firms
would maintain the kansayaku system and continue
to maintain managerial autonomy and insulation
from the demands of shareholders.

To some extent this appears to be proving correct, judging from
reports of trends in adopting the New Type Company form since
the option was implemented from June 2003. However, these are
still early days, and a final assessment is further complicated by
what is meant by ‘globally oriented firms’. Sony quickly became a
New Type Company, and indeed went a step further than required
by separating out the posts of Board Chairperson and Chief
Executive Officer.11 The form has also been adopted by large
companies particularly in the consumer electronics sector, with
less foreign ownership, but certainly exposed to and engaging with
highly competitive markets world-wide. However, of the 55 firms
which had become New Type Companies by August 2003, several
appear distinctly more domestically focused, such as large retailers
and smaller banks (Kubori 2003, pp. 4-5). It could be that these
firms want to become more ‘globally oriented’, either by attracting

11

‘Revised Commercial Code Introduces US-Style Corporate Governance’ 42(5)
Japan Labor Bulletin (May 2003), p.2. Kashiwagi (2003, p. 5) sees this sort of step
as crucial to the success of New Type Companies, to fracture a practice of
Chairpersons (typically also CEOs) electing their successors, despite
Nominating Committees in New Type Companies formally being required to
have a majority of outside directors.

2005] CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND LAW REFORM IN JAPAN

17

foreign investment or expanding into markets abroad, but that is
difficult to prove. Another explanation may be that these firms
now believe that New Type Companies have more efficient
corporate governance, which translates into better economic
performance, even primarily in domestic markets. They may also
think that this is due to this form being ‘American’, and discount
problems in the US exposed by corporate collapses like Enron’s, or
believe in the form’s efficiency because they have heard of it or its
variants being adopted in Anglo-Commonwealth countries or even
some in continental Europe (Hill and Yablon 2003). But such
‘global’ considerations may be minimal or non-existent for most of
these firms, filtered out in the recommendations reached by
policy-makers like METI, and the mass of media reporting on
Japan’s now regular corporate law reforms.
In short, even an intensification of more broad-based adoption of
the New Type Company form may be better conceptualized as a
pragmatic inculcation of more abstract or ‘indigenized’
expectations about governance and its putative links to economic
performance.12 Nonetheless, this is occurring in the context of the
other institutional and normative shifts towards more control by
shareholders over managers, outlined above. Many of these
involve more control-oriented mechanisms, which may resonate
also with non-US traditions in operating companies. Although
seemingly less noted or widely talked about (Kozuka 2003), arm’s
length mechanisms – more representative of Americanisation
generally – do continue to gain strength too in this important
stakeholder relationship.

12

On pragmatism and ‘creolisation’ in globalisation involving Japan, see
generally Befu (2003, pp. 16-19). Kubori (2003, pp. 5-6) highlights another
important practicality. By June 2006, even Old Type Companies must find at
least two outside statutory auditors. Because this creates similar challenges to
finding independent directors, he expects then a majority of well-known
companies to become New Type Companies.
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B. CREDITORS, RECESSION, AND FINANCIAL MARKET DEREGULATION
A distinctive feature of post-War corporate governance in Japan
has been the greater importance of creditors as stakeholders, due
to comparatively more use of bank rather than equity finance. Yet
this characteristic has been fading over the last two decades, as
companies accumulated retained earnings and gradual financial
market deregulation permitted them to more readily raise funds
through bond issues and so on. Another spate of recent reforms to
the Commercial Code is aimed at further boosting equity finance,
by giving investors and managers more choices over how to
capitalize a new venture and more choices over how to meet the
ongoing funding needs of the new business – just as share options
and buybacks provide more choices over how to design incentive
schemes to ensure its continued efficient operation. The logic
behind the reforms is consistent with other government initiatives
to shake Japan out of its protracted economic malaise. With news
dominated still by bankruptcies and rising unemployment, the
government hoped the reforms would spark corporate-led
economic growth. The reasoning is that a more flexible toolkit of
corporate finance tools should allow efficient, new businesses to
replace failing, unproductive industries. More importantly, the
greater range of financing options should empower expanding
businesses to satisfy more flexibly their ongoing funding needs.
The 151st annual session of the Diet in 2001 enacted a number of
changes to allow greater freedom to determine the initial capital
structure of a Japanese kabushiki kaisha (joint stock company, the
main focus of this chapter). The key amendments, which came
into effect on 1 October 2001, include:
•

abolishing the requirement that the issue price of shares at
the time of incorporation must be a minimum of 50,000
yen;

•

removing the prohibition on share splits that caused either
(i) the aggregate nominal amount of the issued shares to
exceed the stated capital or (ii) the amount of net assets per
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stock to be less than 50,000 yen — moreover, share splits
can now be effected by a board decision without a
shareholder vote, even if it requires an amendment to the
company’s articles of incorporation to increase the number
of authorized shares;
•

abolishing par-value shares, thereby eliminating any
differences between par-value shares and no-par shares; and

•

introducing the voting unit (tangen-kabu) system, under
which a Japanese company may provide in its articles of
incorporation that a certain number of its shares constitute
one unit, that is, one voting right.

Tanahashi (2002) argues that these amendment removed
significant hurdles for fast-growing start-up companies. Prior to
the amendments, the minimum share price requirement meant
that early start-ups, often without significant net assets, would
issue only a few shares. Company growth would cause these
shares to represent significant value in the company, making it
difficult to raise further funds by granting share options. Further,
the post-split net asset requirement meant that share splits were
not always possible. A possible stop-gap measure — issuing no-par
shares at a nominal value pro-rata among all shareholders — was
impractical in post-IPO companies, because it was not realistic to
require all shareholders pay even nominal consideration for the
newly issued shares. Therefore, abolishing minimum share prices,
net asset value requirements for share splits and par-value shares
— as well as allowing differential voting rights — has given startup companies greater flexibility in structuring their initial
capitalisation to allow for future expansion.13
Further, under Commercial Code amendments approved on 21
November 2001 and coming into effect on 1 April 2002,
corporations are able to streamline the means by which it can

13

More generally on venture business, see for example Sibbitt 1998b.
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obtain ongoing equity financing, especially when multiple
infusions of equity are required over a relatively short period of
time. This allows for smooth financing of companies, particularly
ventures and emerging companies which often cannot secure debt
funding from banks. Under the former law, companies often
needed to secure a special resolution — at a properly convened
general meeting — to access equity finance during periods of high
growth. Thus, the so-called ‘4:1 rule’ restricted the number of
shares a company could issue in a given capital increase to four
times the number of shares that the company already had
outstanding. This meant that pre-IPO companies, seeking multiple
infusion of equity financing, would have to go through a long,
drawn-out series of issuances, each time convening a general
meeting to secure a two-thirds vote to amend the number of
authorized shares in its articles of incorporation. Adding to this
complexity, the Commercial Code granted pre-emptive rights to
shareholders for any new issuance of shares. Once again, a twothirds shareholder vote was required to issue new shares without
honouring such pre-emptive rights.
The new provisions simplify the procedures for growing business
to acquire as-needed equity funding. Thus, the 4:1 rule no longer
applies to closed companies (that is, those companies whose
articles of incorporation require director transfers of shares); and
shareholders can now authorize the board of a closed company to
issue, at its discretion over a one year period, a specified number of
new shares to third parties at favourable prices without honouring
pre-emptive rights.
In addition, the revised Commercial Code increases the types of
shares publically listed companies may issue. These include:
•

preferred shares or non-common shares with no voting
rights or with limited voting rights;

•

tracking shares, where the dividends are not fixed but
linked to the performance of a certain segment or subsidiary
of the issuing company;
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•

protected shares where holders can exercise veto rights in
respect of certain company actions; and

•

mandatory convertible shares where the shares may be
converted into another type of share at the discretion of the
issuing company and not the holder.

With these reforms only coming into effect in late 2001 and 2002,
it is still too early to tell whether the new provisions are having
their desired effect. However, as with the steady uptake in stock
option and share buyback schemes mentioned above (Part II.2),
there is some evidence that companies are enthusiastically taking
advantage of their increased financing powers.
Conversely, already in mid-1997 (before Japan’s banking crisis), a
survey of managers found that 60 percent expected the role of
‘main banks’ to decline (Yasui 1999: 12). The relative importance
of equity markets in corporate finance will undoubtedly expand in
importance in the wake of ongoing economic stagnation and the
current severe credit crunch, combined with globalisation and
broader financial market deregulation. The latter program was
initiated at the end of 1996, but mostly from 1998, due to poor
return on capital by Japanese financial institutions throughout the
post-War period, and especially a rapid loss of global
competitiveness in the 1990s. This ‘Big Bang’ (or ‘Long Bang’!) is
now complete, and the legislative and structural reforms are very
wide-ranging.14
As mentioned above (Part II.1), like other stakeholder
relationships, the relationship between creditors and managers
gives rise to problems of adverse selection (leading to credit going
too readily to risky firms) and of moral hazard (monitoring

14

A comprehensive time-line is available from the Ministry of Finance, at
http://www.mof.go.jp/english/big-bang/ebb33.pdf; see also (Sibbitt 1998a).
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problems allowing poor projects by management). Blame for the
abrupt decline in the Japanese financial sector over the 1990s lies
in part with the Japanese government, particularly the Ministry of
Finance (the Bank of Japan having become a more independent
policy maker only recently). Yet Japanese financial institutions
were also responsible for their own plight, having embarked on a
huge spending spree in the late 1980s, which has led to the
massive bad debts reported in recent years. Generally, this disaster
stems from distortions in evaluating and pricing risk. Specifically,
it relates to problems in corporate governance which encouraged
financial institutions in Japan to lend (and invest) in risky firms,
and then not adequately monitor managers in those firms (Kanaya
and Woo 2000).
One solution for these tensions between creditors and managers is
to give creditors shares in the companies they lend to. This helps
to the extent that shareholders generally can overcome agency
problems vis-à-vis managers (on which, therefore, see again Part
II.1). In addition, creditors can attempt to monitor managers in
two main ways. One, again, involves more arm’s length control.
The creditor still delegates much control to managers, but may
step in to force bankruptcy, thus creating an incentive for
managers to pursue creditors’ interests (Hoshi 1998: 853).
However, forcing bankruptcy must be a credible option, and
Japanese bankruptcy law has had various problems which only
started to be addressed seriously towards the end of the 1990s
(Anderson 2000: 700-24; Anderson 2001; Anderson and Steele
2003). One result has been enactment of a more functional
corporate reorganisation regime in 1999. From when the Civil
Rehabilitation Law came into effect in April 2000 through to
August 2002, 31 reoganisations had been initiated and 16 had been
resolved in about six months, compared to an average of two years
under the old Corporate Reorganisation Law over the same period
(Xu 2003). Further, West (2003a: 25) observes that this regime,
which also applied to individuals, was little used by them until
amendments were added in 2000 (adding home mortgage
exemptions, and so on). But he argues that its more ready
availability and uptake since then has helped legitimate
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bankruptcy and reduce its social stigma, even contributing to a
decline in consumer debt related suicides. Although less or
different stigma may be attached to bankruptcies for companies,
this further ‘norm shift’ prompted by law reform seems likely to
underpin increasing use of corporate insolvency options as arm’s
length control mechanisms by creditors over the managers in
firms they lend to.
Alternatively, or in addition, creditors can adopt more controloriented strategies. They can monitor more directly the behaviour
of managers, and intervene if necessary in their appointment or
replacement. One way in which Japanese banks have been able to
directly monitor their lenders’ managers, at least within Japan, has
been by providing a range of services (such as general business
advice or match-making) rather than just loans. Yet that was
difficult in overseas lending; and encountered difficulties
domestically as Japanese companies themselves became more
sophisticated, and competition intensified as a result of
accelerating financial markets deregulation (Ouandlous and
Philippatos 1999). The latter, combined with the recessionary
environment facing Japanese financial institutions in particular,
also makes it more difficult to retain the long-term relationship
required to be a firm’s ‘main bank’ (Yasui 1999: 12-13). Key aspects
were a primary lender which also held shares over lengthy periods,
and intervened especially in times of debtor’s financial distress by
seconding bank managers. As banks become strapped for funds,
however, they may call in their loans or simply refuse to lend
more; an increase in lender liability claims by debtors was noted
already in the mid-1990s (Milhaupt 1996: 49-55). More recently,
other cases have been reported in which main banks did not save
companies by providing loans, while in other instances they did
not bear a disproportionate burden of losses following liquidation.
A related phenomenon is a belated ‘flight to quality’ in lending,
perversely exacerbating the present credit crunch. Finally, there is
evidence of banks selling off their shareholdings, reportedly after
client firms offloaded their stocks in banks, and in the shadow of
dangerous declines in the ratio of market over book value (4:1 in
1986, but only just over 1:1 in 1998 (Fukao 1999: 6-8)). Unwinding
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shareholdings prevents financial institutions remaining or
developing into a main bank, better able to monitor debtor firms,
and creates less incentive to send their own managers to debtor
firms if in distress (especially as even the big banks have enough
problems of their own nowadays!). Reputation as a main bank can
unravel quickly, and is difficult to regain (Tsuru 1999: 8).
Such breakdowns become even more likely as more and more
foreign financial institutions have taken advantage of deregulation
to enter the Japanese market since the late 1990s (Sibbitt 1998).
These outsiders are particularly likely not to take over, and
certainly not take on, even small shareholdings in debtor firms in
such a changing environment. Even if they do, they may refuse to
‘take
turns’,
accepting
the
delegation
of
other
creditor/shareholders to send valuable management resources to
help keep debtor firms alive. Their inclination, no doubt often in
their short-term interest, may be to enforce their strict legal rights,
calling in their security or forcing bankruptcy. After all, lending
institutions (and associations) in Japan have long made sure that
their strict rights are well protected by contract and commercial
practice at the time of lending (Kanda 1998: 940).
Three other factors continue to undermine the main bank system
(Milhaupt 2001: 19-21). The first arises from the nationalisation
and re-privatisation of the failed Long-Term Credit Bank. The
government sold it to a group of foreign investors including
Citigroup, giving a ‘put option’ to return any assets (loans) that
decline from book value (as of 1 March 2000) by 20 percent or
more within three years. But this is lost if the bank accepts a
borrower’s request for loan forgiveness. In mid-2000, the reprivatized bank refused to forgive debts owed by Sogo Department
Store, forcing it into bankruptcy, going against what has been
expected a main bank. More generally, bank failures like this one
undercut an implicit guarantee against this given by the Japanese
government (Milhaupt and Miller 1997), in exchange for strong
institutions supporting weak ones through the main bank system.
Finally, the Asian financial crisis and Japan’s long recession are
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perceived to have caused a significant shift in beliefs about the
benefits of bank-oriented corporate finance and governance.
C. EMPLOYEES AND THE VICISSITUDES OF THE LABOUR MARKET
Another often cited aspect of Japanese corporate governance,
especially through to the 1980s, is also under threat: the strong
influence of employees (for example Miwa 1998). The
conventional wisdom has been that Japanese corporate governance
was profoundly influenced by the orientation of companies first
towards ‘people’ (ie employees), then ‘products’ (ie technically
excellent goods), then ‘profits’ (for shareholders). This is contrasted
with the German model (fixated first on products, then people, and
then profits), and especially the Anglo-American model (first
profits, then products, people last!). The importance of employees
in Japanese companies has admittedly been strong, at least
‘regular’ employees in larger corporations (a steadily declining
proportion).15 Yet this factor can also be analyzed in terms of
agency problems, and how their stakeholding in companies relates
to that of other stakeholders. That analysis, together with
observed tendencies in the labour market and important
legislative amendments, points to further growing pressures on
Japanese corporate governance.16
Usually, discussions of relations between employees and managers
centre on the latter as ‘principals’, attempting to hire the former as

15

Lehmann 1997: 96-99. This relative ranking picture accords with some survey
evidence included in a book published in 1997 by a Kyoto University economics
professor (Tachibanaki 1999: 51). However, the proportion of non-regular
employees continues to grow (Abe 2002).
16
See also Fukao (1999: 21, 23). But see Haley (2002: before note 19), asserting –
still with very little empirical data on labour market transformations – that
Japan will not change its fundamentally ‘communitarian’ orientation without
change in what sees as the most distinctive and central institutional feature of
post-War Japan: ‘entry level hiring coupled with a central personnel office
staffed by senior career manager(s) with full responsibility for the recruitment,
training, assignment and promotion of career staff’.
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‘agents’ despite the possibility of adverse selection, and to monitor
their delegated activities despite moral hazard (‘shirking’, due
again to imperfect information in the relationship). This can
simply be reversed to analyze implications for corporate
governance. The problem then becomes how employees, as
principals, constrain managers, agents who may prefer to fritter
away company funds on themselves. One solution is to give
employees shares in the company. However, Employee Share
Ownership Programmes (ESOPs) still do not play such a major role
in Japanese corporate governance (Hayakawa 1997), and will only
constrain managers to the extent that agency problems between
shareholders and managers are resolved generally (Part II.2 above).
Otherwise, the only realistic alternative is more control-oriented
measures. One example is the two-tier board structure for
Germany stock companies, in which a supervisory board is partly
elected by employees, and then appoints management board
members (du Plessis 2004). Japanese corporate law provides no
such formal mechanism for employee supervision of managers.
Yet control arises in practice especially because most managers in
large Japanese companies have been appointed from among
existing employees, in a system of life-long employment and
promotion based primarily on seniority. Correspondingly, the
external labour market has not grown much in recent decades.
Again, the origins of such institutions are unclear. Like several
supposedly distinctive features of Japanese law (such as limited
numbers of practising lawyers (Haley 1978), the practice of lifelong
employment seems to have taken root only quite recently (cf also
Foote 1996). Gilson and Roe (1999: 520) observe that ‘from World
War I through to the end of World War II, worker mobility in
external labor markets eroded labor stability when labor was tight,
and employees’ willingness to fire even senior workers eroded
labor stability when labor markets were not tight. Employees tried
but failed to build wage and seniority structures to induce workers
to stay during labor shortages. Government intervention reduced
but failed to stop turnover’. They argue that lifetime employment
practices arose in the even more unlikely economic environment
shortly after World War II, characterized by extreme labour
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surplus, because of exceptional political events. Rapid
unionisation and radical worker activism (strikes and plant
takeovers) prompted conservative reactions and a ‘deal’
establishing a privileged segment of labour (mainly surviving
employees) accorded lifetime employment. Thereafter, ‘Japan’s
economic problem was to craft associated institutions that could
function effectively given the politically imposed lifetime
employment’, including restrictions in external labour markets
(ibid: 524). Yet nowadays Japan faces a very different political as
well as economic environment, with record unemployment (and
further ‘under-employment’), and institutional changes opening up
the possibility again of increasing worker mobility through
external labour markets. Gilson and Roe (ibid: 540) also identify
several significant ‘stress points’ in the post-War Japanese system.
For instance, it does not cope well during times of dramatic
technological change,17 and ‘competition’ among lifelong
employees for promotion in an internal labour market will not
work effectively when firms no longer are growing.
Rather similarly, Shishido (2000: 222) points out that labour
turnover rates in the 1920s and 1930s were almost the same as
those in the US, but the latter jumped in the 1940s and have
remained much higher ever since. He argues that the
transformation in the US was linked to the Great Depression, and
that if the Japanese recession continues there will be an
irreversible decline in lifetime employment as a key aspect
sustaining the post-War corporate governance system in Japan.
More generally, ongoing recession creates a zero-sum situation and
heightens conflicts between employees and other stakeholders,
notably shareholders. The latter will no longer tolerate employees
being treated as de facto residual claimants, for instance earning
wage hikes or salary bonuses while dividends remain constant or
decline (cf also Ghosn 2003: 17). In parallel, Shishido (ibid: 217)

17

Including significant developments in IT in the late 1990s, after an admittedly
slow start at least compared to the US (Nottage 1998, Ibusuki and Nottage 2002,
Jain 2002).
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identifies considerable strengthening of the external labour market
and the corporate control (share-) market.
Labour law scholars such as Yamakawa (1999), perhaps due to
reliance on more historical data, are more impressed by the
enduring quality of the post-War model; but note a number of
major challenges to this model. One is precisely the broader
political economy environment. The recession plus deregulation
create more variability in corporate profitability, a key factor as
the credit crunch still facing Japanese financial institutions further
encourages companies to turn to stock and bond markets — often
global, and more demanding of good corporate and managerial
performance. In addition, the service sector continues to grow in
importance, bringing the need for (and the possibility of) more
flexible working hours (cf also Hanami 1999). Both factors are
related to changing demographics in the labour force generally,
characterized by more elderly people, women, and part-time
workers (Kezuka 2000). This also affects the resilience of lifelong
employment as a core concept in the Japanese corporate world.
Yamakawa (2001) still concludes that it will remain, albeit with
some modifications. Data from various surveys supports such
conclusions, although also often confirming a move towards
performance-based remuneration.18 However, a problem with
most of these surveys is that they question incumbents within
firms. To get a better picture of the future of this central aspect of
Japan’s employment and corporate governance systems, more
research should be conducted into what young people want
nowadays. Certainly it seems that they are disillusioned with the
fact that present employment patterns in Japan are strongly biased
towards the incumbent, older generation, especially those in
lifelong employment (Genda 1999, 2003).

18

See the three surveys over 1999-2000 summarized in Nottage 2001b; and
generally Abe 2002.
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In addition, Yamakawa (2001) surveys major changes recently
made to an array of labour legislation. These should cement in
place or encourage broader transformations in the labour market
in Japan, sometimes following changes in norms and/or underlying
socio-economic institutions (as with takeovers: Milhaupt 2001)
and sometimes rather prompting them (as with consumer
bankruptcy reform: West 2003a). These changes include, for
instance:19

19

•

1998 amendments to the Labour Standards Law: allowing
longer-term
labour
contracts;
requiring
written
clarifications of work conditions upon hire, and reasons for
termination (a growing source of tension); and divorcing
overtime payments from hours worked (indicating more
stress on quality of work);

•

1997 amendments to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Law (Wolff 2003): now prohibiting discrimination in
recruitment, assignment, promotion, as well as in dismissal
and retirement; compelling employers to mediation if
requested by employees; and addressing problems of sexual
harassment (still a frequent source of litigation, since the
early 1990s);

•

1995 amendments (in effect from April 1999) to the Child
Care Law: extending leave to provide care to elderly family
members (Webb 2002);

•

1999 enactment of a Fundamental Law for a Gender-Equal
Society (which may encourage affirmative action

Further details on these and related changes affecting especially Japan’s
external labour market are set out in (Nottage and Wolff 2000-3, paras JPN ¶60003 ff) and (Nottage 2001b). Updated information can be found readily in the
regular publications freely available from the Japan Institute for Labour Policy
and Training (formerly the Japan Institute of Labour, at
http://www.jil.go.jp/english/index.html), as well as the extra recent references
cited in the text.
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programmes, or other broader transformations in women’s
work: cf generally Miller 2003);
•

1999 amendments to the Working Dispatching Law:
abolishing the ‘positive list’ system of limiting dispatching
to specified (professional) job categories, in favour of a
‘negative list’ system; and putting pressure on companies
using such temporary helpers to offer them employment
first if the company decide to hire for work done by them
(potentially creating a new hybrid category of employees);

•

Simultaneous amendments to the Employment Security
Law: also changing to a ‘negative list’ system for private
placement of non-temporary workers; clearer licensing for
businesses doing this; and replacement of a blanket fee
maximum chargeable (which hampered attempts to headhunt and place managers) (West 2003b: 17-20);

•

moves to promote pension plans based on ‘defined
contributions’ pension, rather than just ‘defined benefits’
(which had discouraged voluntary job-switching, because
complete vesting was unusual).

In addition to recent changes in the legal environment, and longstanding transformations in political economy broadly related to
globalisation described at the start of this Part, globalisation is also
beginning to have a more direct effect on the Japanese labour
market. In the boom times of the 1980s, many ‘guest workers’
were brought in for blue-collar work which Japanese were
unwilling to touch. Many have stayed on, often illegally. Yet a
significant feature of the 1990s has been a slowly growing presence
of white-collar employees and managers, even at the highest
executive level. This is most noticeable in the financial sector, but
it is tied to broader patterns in foreign direct investment,
especially increasing Mergers and Acquisitions involving
companies from abroad (Milhaupt and West 2001). While it is too
early to say what independent effect these developments will have
on the labour market in Japan, cumulatively they reinforce the
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changes described above, impacting on the future of corporate
governance in Japan.
D. CONFLICTING TENDENCIES IN INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION AND THE
STATE?
Thus, applying basic principal-agent theory to analyze three key
aspects of Japanese corporate governance suggests that the
interests of managers and shareholder have drawn closer together;
that severe challenges have emerged for corporate finance centred
on main banks; but pressures reshaping employment relations may
be less obvious and consolidate only over the longer term. Overall,
this amounts to more convergence towards arm’s length relations
characteristic of Anglo-American corporate governance. Further
complicating the picture, however, the notion of opportunism
underlying principal-agent theory may not be the only force at
work. This become apparent when we look at further stakeholders
in the firm.
Another important set of stakeholders, affecting the relations
among the others described so far, consists of the firm’s outside
suppliers and customers. Particularly intriguing are the
cooperative relations which have developed among firms,
especially in the automobile industry, notably in post-war Japan
but later finding root in the US. Some recent studies of industrial
organisation have focused on ‘learning by monitoring’ in this
industry (and some others), involving: (i) benchmarking (exacting
surveys of current and likely future products and processes) to
uncover new general products, (ii) simultaneous engineering
(where sub-units responsible for components undertake similar
benchmarking, while considering implications for other sub-units,
which may lead to redefining the project as a whole), and (iii)
systems of strict error detection and correction for the new
routines, with further extensive information sharing to respond
quickly before consequences become disastrous (Helper, McDuffie
and Sabel 2000: 466). The emergence of this paradigm suggests
that pervasive patterns of information sharing may entrench
norms of cooperation, seen not just as a means of securing
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individual benefits but rather as an end in itself, underpinned by a
vision of ‘enlarging the pie’ rather than trying to obtain a larger
slice at the others’ expense. History also shows how dramatic
changes in conditions may unravel such collaborative relations (as
in the US automobile industry over the 1950s-70s), but then build
them up again as underlying mechanisms become apparent (as in
the 1980s-90s) (ibid: 476-7).
It is not yet clear what has happened to relations among firms in
Japan’s automobile industry, especially since the late 1990s, when
the changes to other aspects of corporate governance described
above appeared to find more traction. Despite some notable
developments, the economic and social logic underpinning
cooperative inter-firm relations may prove resistant in this
industry. It is demonstrably more successful, and still holds
reserves to draw on, compared for instance to Japan’s weak
financial sector. Further, although Japan’s auto manufacturers are
now using e-commerce to unwind keiretsu or preferential
relationships with suppliers for standardized products, they seem
to be retaining such relationships for more technologically
complex parts.20 Relative stasis in such an important production
chain would present a tension with the trends towards change
identified above (Parts II.1-3), even if the latter relations (mostly
within the firm) are more determinative of corporate governance.
But a similar tension arguably characterized the US over the 1980s
and 1990s, as contracting among firms (at least in some
manufacturing and services sectors) became more based on
information sharing and learning by monitoring, yet arm’s length
control and market-based coordination increasingly characterized
corporate governance in its narrower sense (Sabel 1996).
The (re-)entrenchment of learning by monitoring mechanisms in
the US at the level of industrial production, and their possible
resilience in Japan, may encourage the emergence of novel forms

20

Kashiwagi (2001: 3.b.v). See also Farrell & Findlay (2004: 258-65). Generally,
on the ambivalent changes in the industry, see for example Ghosn 2003.
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of corporate governance in both countries: ‘corporate incubators’
for strategic thinking established within firms, performance
metrics based on baskets of measures subjected to continuous
review and redefinition, and venture capitalists. However, these
applications are less well established than in industrial production,
and are thought to run more risk of being displaced by more
straightforward market-based corporate governance mechanisms
(Helper et al 2000: 477-501).
On the other hand, they may also be supported by similar
processes of learning by monitoring being played out at other
levels implicating two further stakeholders in corporate
organisations. The first is individual consumers and their
organisations, as opposed to business customers of firms. Traces of
the three elements characteristic of ‘learning by monitoring’
model described above – benchmarking by the person requiring the
goods, simultaneous engineering by sub-units involving in
production, and careful error detection and reporting – seem at
least partially applicable to the relationships that build up to link
consumers via retailers to manufacturers. A key premise is proactive and demanding consumers, prepared to voice their needs
and complaints, but this is precisely what has emerged quite
steadily since World War II and particularly since the 1990s.21 In
recent years, this has seemed more to involve a more cynical and
confrontational attitude on the part of consumers. However, a new
equilibrium may now be close, involving patterns of more
pervasive and balanced information sharing that may entrench
new norms of cooperation based on mutual respect.
The model is more directly applicable at the level of the state, as a
second broader stakeholder in corporate organisations. An
important parallel trend in advanced industrialized democracies
appears to be ‘democratic experimentalism’ (Dorf and Sabel 1998),
involving: (a) central authorities which ‘create a framework for

21

Maclachlan 2002; Nottage and Trezise 2003; Nottage 2004: especially 8-16.
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experimentation by defining broad problems, setting provisional
standards, pooling measurements of local performance, aiding poor
performers to correct their problems, and revising standards and
overall goals according to results’; and (b) ‘local units doing most
of the problem-solving but which are ‘accountable to the center,
and to their local constituents, who participate in formulating its
plans, and judge it both against those goals and in comparison to
the performance to the performance of other locales in like
circumstances’ (Sabel and O’Donnell 2000: 17). Key parameters in
experimentation involving the state are again transparency and
participation by diverse affected actors, to prompt access to — and
effective use of — information to develop collaborative and
effective relations. Important trends in this direction in Japan
nowadays include:
•

sweeping deregulation programmes, although these have
tended to get bogged down in detail and bureaucracy (Katz
2002);

•

enactment of comprehensive official information disclosure
legislation in 1999 (Shultz 2001);

•

more engagement with foreigners and foreign models, at
some levels (Clark 2000; Takao 2003);

•

some legal recognition of previously marginalized ethnic
groups (Stewart 2003);

•

adroit attempts by other minorities to avoid ‘bureaucratic
capture’ while improving their lot (Nakamura 2001);

•

more support for such initiatives through reforms of
legislation involving Non-Profit Organisations (Pekkanen
2000); and

•

greater opportunities to build on traditions of local
autonomy in Japan (Jain 2000).
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These shifts are also underpinned by major reforms underway
since 2001 regarding access to justice in Japan, although driven
also by business interests (Kitagawa and Nottage 2004). To be sure,
such steps towards a more vibrant civil society (Schwartz and
Pharr eds, 2003) may have been more faltering even than in some
neighbouring countries, like Korea (see eg Ginsburg 2001). Yet
significant momentum has been generated in Japan over the last
decade, pointing the way towards more sustained polyarchic
‘deliberative democracy’ there too (cf generally Cohen and Sabel
1997). This adds further contingencies and difficulties in assessing
existing and potential changes in Japanese corporate governance,
pressuring firms into taking ‘corporate social responsibility’ more
seriously (Iwai and Kobayashi 2003: 12). But these more political
dimensions may prove to be the most crucial, despite having been
overlooked by most theorists during Japan’s lost decade.22 The
seeming paralysis of Japanese policy-makers can then be seen in a
more positive light. Perhaps it shows important elements of
‘democratic experimentalism’, with (a) central authorities slowly
reorganising key building blocks after extensive analysis of worldwide trends, but (b) leaving it primarily to social-economic subunits (such as major stakeholders in firms including creditors and
employees, with their peak associations) to find a new balance and
forms of governance combining efficiency with normative
acceptability (cf for example West 2001a). However, that more
positive assessment turns crucially on whether the Japanese state
is and will remain committed to fostering information flows and
decentralized participation in decision-making among diverse
socio-economic groups.
III. CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has outlined a broad conception of corporate
governance incorporating a variety of stakeholders both within
and outside firms, considering information flows among some of
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See, however, Fort and Schipani 2000: 865; Ballon and Honda 2000: xviii; and
Gilson and Roe 1999.
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them. A primary aim has been to assess the extent of change in
Japan, particularly towards a ‘US’ model dominated by shareholder
interests and arm’s length relationships. Key actors and
relationships, and some of the shifts, are depicted in Figure 1
below:
FIGURE 1: CONCENTRIC CIRCLES OF STAKEHOLDER INFLUENCE
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Mgr = Managers
Sh
= Shareholders
Eee = Employees
Sup = Suppliers
Cer = Consumers
Govt = State
NGO =
Non-Government
Organisations
→
= Changing Influence
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The darkened core includes the stakeholders which have
traditionally been of most concern to substantive corporate law
applied to public listed companies. First, shareholders, and their
relationships with managers, have been of key doctrinal
significance. Part II.1 showed how this has grown in practical
importance particularly since the 1990s, strongly pulling
shareholders towards the centre of Japan’s brave new world of
corporate governance. Although the expanding relative importance
of shareholders is partly achieved through more direct controls
(such as derivative suits), more arm’s length control is also
increasing. Second, the stakeholder position of employees has only
recently been highlighted in corporate governance discussions
focused on Anglo-American-Australian law and practice,
particularly in the aftermath of large corporate insolvencies (Hill
and Yablon 2003). But its significance has long been apparent in
Japan, at least since the 1950s, especially in the form of life-long
employment and other de facto constraints on managers of large
companies. Despite considerable durability of the latter model,
however, distinctions and arm’s length relationships are emerging
between employees and managers. The role of employees, as
stakeholders independently monitoring managers, is therefore
declining (Part II.3).23 Thirdly, creditors have also found little
formal recognition within substantive corporate law, yet their
stakeholder role became clear in post-War Japan through the main
bank system. The latter’s decline and corresponding moves to
encourage further emphasis on equity financing, underpinned by
financial markets deregulation, may even be propelling creditors

23

Proposed whistle-blowing legislation may offset this tendency, despite
problems with draft legislation submitted to Cabinet (‘A Whistle-Blower Bill
Has Insufficient Safeguards’, International Herald Tribune (Herald Asahi), 24
January 2004). However, whistle-blowing may actually reinforces the
distinction between employees and managers, and it helps other stakeholders
(notably shareholders), so law reform and practice in this area constitutes
another facet of a transfigured corporate governance regime evolving now in
Japan.
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outside the realm of core stakeholders in Japanese corporate
governance (Part II.2).
Fourthly, suppliers may be drawn into or nearer the core, to the
extent that long-term collaborative relationships based on
information-sharing through ‘learning through monitoring’ can be
maintained or expanded. Their situation is ambivalent, however,
because many supply relationships are becoming much more arm’s
length, due to deregulation and ongoing recession. Simply ‘exiting’
is easier in such relationships, so they may result in diminished
potential for mutual monitoring between suppliers and buyers. By
contrast, consumers and their interest groups represent a fifth set
of stakeholders which has become more actively engaged in firms,
highlighting a greater role in corporate governance. That tendency
is supported by broader shifts, finally, involving the state and its
citizens. The Japanese government has blatant interests in
corporate performance – notably economic recovery and
restoration of the tax base – which make it important as a direct
stakeholder. It is also significant more indirectly, by intensifying
deregulation and other structural reforms which have already
prompted major realignments in other stakeholder relationships
within Japanese corporate governance. Another more subtle role
for the state in Japan nowadays may be to reinforce variants of the
‘learning by monitoring’ model, based on a more optimistic and
‘embedded’ view of human relationships (Swedberg and
Granovetter eds, 2001) than that underpinning agency theory
analyses of information flows (Part II.4).
Thus, as we move out beyond the core of Japan’s corporate
governance world depicted above, the picture becomes
increasingly complicated. The extent of change in the
relationships affecting more peripheral stakeholders, and what
concerns and philosophies are driving those relationships, become
more difficult to explain or predict. By contrast, change is clearer
at the core, even allowing for the tendency of comparative lawyers
to see more transformations or convergence when comparing lawrelated phenomena more narrowly (Nottage 2001a). There are
indeed considerable tendencies towards convergence on a
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shareholder-oriented model of corporate governance, at the
expense of an employee-oriented one and especially a bankoriented model.
Yet, the control mechanisms are not just more arm’s length ones,
fitting best with US socio-economic ideology. Straightforward
‘Americanisation’ is also undermined by some ongoing attraction
of German (and now EU) traditions, or even AngloCommonwealth variants of the ‘US model’. Perhaps most
importantly, as we progress beyond the core concerns of corporate
lawyers, the complex and shifting role of the state reminds us that
much will depend on political contingencies. On the one hand,
Japan’s recent ‘elective corporate governance reform’ show a
tendency towards ‘reformist conservatism’ consistent with other
recent law-related reforms, notably legal education (Nottage
2001c). A sense emerges of a wide-ranging crisis and that
something must be done, but the change ends up superimposing a
new model on top of an old one (rather than abandoning the latter)
with more or less incentives to adopt the new model. The
incentives have been more pervasive in legal education reform, but
weaker or more disparate so far for corporate organisation,
depending for example on the degree to which firms and their
sectors are open to global competitive pressures (Schaede and
Grimes 2003). On the other hand, there seem likely to be limits to
generalisations about Japan’s new political environment and
policy-making processes (cf Grimes and Schaede 2003). Broader
promotion of ‘learning by monitoring’ within and by Japan’s polity
may also reinforce growing value pluralism (Moehwald 2000), and
it may be possible to track the latter’s complex bedding down in
general and specific policy-making processes impacting on
corporate governance and commercial regulation more generally
(see generally Huntington and Harrison 2000). However,
ultimately or in some areas, the interactions may become so
complex that they may be understood more parsimoniously by
applying something like ‘chaos theory’, which focuses on how
small regular iterations can result in large and often counterintuitive changes (cf generally for example Williams and Arrigo
2001).
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What is clear already, from the broad-based analyses of changes of
corporate governance outlined in this chapter, is that corporate
law in Japan is playing an integral role in this process (see also for
example Kanda and Milhaupt 2003). Indeed, changes to corporate
law – and areas of law impacting on stakeholders in a broader
sense than other than those focused on by corporate law itself –
seem to have been quite dramatic and effective. This is ironic from
the perspective of the US, where corporate practices and
expectations changed well before corporate law was transfigured,
and prominent commentators expect that this phenomenon is a
powerful one elsewhere (Hansmann and Kraakman 2001). Other
commentators seem to have underestimated the potential, at least
in Japan, for law to prompt ongoing socio-economic change in
Japan (for example Milhaupt 2003: 29-31; cf generally Aoki 2003).
Yet law’s precise role remains intriguing — sometimes cementing
or following social norms or institutional changes; sometimes
prompting considerable transformations.
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